Academic vs. Practical Decisions in Process/Reactor Safety

Complex Technical Decisions

In our increasingly technical and complex world, senior executives and politicians (who are often without extensive technical training) must make decisions (that may be “life or death” decisions at some point in the future) regarding the technology they supervise. This is true in many industries including the nuclear energy, oil and gas, refining, healthcare, chemical, nuclear weapons, and artificial intelligence industries.

I ran across a short letter to the editor written by Admiral Rickover that provides some sage advice for decision makers faced with these tough decisions. Even though this advice was first given by the Admiral back in 1953 (when he was still a Captain), I believe it is just as important today as it was then. Therefore, I will pass this information on and, after you read the Admiral’s advice, translate the theory you read into practical suggestions.

Admiral Rickover’s Advice To Senior Decision Makers

Here is a letter written by Admiral Rickover that is often referred to as the “Paper Reactor” letter…

You can download a PDF of the letter above or read an excerpt from an editorial in The Journal of Reactor Science and Technology, Volume 3, No. 3, below…

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Important decisions relative to the future development of atomic power must frequently be made by people who do not necessarily have an intimate knowledge of the technical aspects of reactors. These people are, nonetheless, interested in what a reactor plant will do, how much it will cost, how long it will take to build, and how long it will operate. When they attempt to learn these things, they become aware of confusion existing in the reactor business. There appears to be unresolved conflict on almost every issue that arises.

I believe that this confusion stems from a failure to distinguish between the academic and the practical. These aparent conflicts can usually be explained only when the various aspects of the issue are resolved into their academic and practical components.. To aid in this resolution, it is possible to define in a general way those characteristics which distinguish the one from the other.

The academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic Characteristics:

1. It is simple.
2. It is small.
3. It is cheap.
4. It is light.
5. It can be built very quickly.
6. It is very flexible in purpose (“omnibus reactor”).
7. Very little development is required. It will mainly use “ogg-the-shelf” components.
8. The reactor is in the study phase. It is not being built now.

On the other hand, a practical reactor plant can be distinguished by the following characteristics:

1. It is being built now.
2. It is behind schedule.
3. It is requiring an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. Corrosion, in particular, is a problem.
4. It is expensive.
5. It takes a long time to build because of the engineering development problems.
6. It is large.
7. It is heavy.
8. It is complicated.

A common example can be given to indicate the application of the above generalities:

A fairly conventional academic power reactor might use natural or slightly enriched uranium rods in which the burn-up is a minimum of 10,000 mwd/ton. The fission products are confined to the fuel element by a simple cladding technique. The elements operate in high pressue water at 600°F.

In the practical reactor, difficulties are encountered. No element of the type above has been carried to more than 4,000 mwd/ton. Eight years of work at Hanford and related laboratories have failed to produce a cladding technique which gives really satisfactory performance at 200°F. At 600°F, uranium reacts violently when exposed to water. The Chauk River experience shows the difficulty of maintaining a plant in which some fission products have escaped.

The tools of the academic-reactor designer are a piece of paper and a pencil with an eraser. If a mistake is made, it can always be erased and changed. If a practical-reactor designer errs, he wears the mistake around his neck; it cannot be erased. Everyone can see it.

The academic-reactor designer is a dilettante. He has not had to assume any real responsibility in connection with his projects. He is free to luxuriate in elegant ideas, the practical shortcomings of which can be relegated to the category of “mere technical details.” The practical-reactor designer must live with these same technical details. Although recalcitrant and awkward, they must be solved and cannot be put off until tomorrow. Their solutions require manpower, time, and money.

Unfortunately for those who must make far-reaching decisions without the benefit of an intimate knowledge of reactor technology and unfortunately for the interested public, it is much easier to get the academic side of an issue than the practical side. For a large part those interested with academic reactors have more inclination and time to present their ideas in reports and orally to those who will listen. Since they are innocently unaware of the real but hidden difficulties of their plans, they speak with great facility and confidence. Those involved with practical reactors, humbled by their experiences, speak less and worry more.

Yet it is incumbent on those in high places to make wise decisions, and it is reasonable and important that the public be correctly informed. It is consequently incumbent on all of us tostate the facts as forthrightly as possible. Although it is probably impossible to have reactor ideas labeled as “practical” or “academic” by the authors, it is worthwhile for both the authors and the audience to bear in mind this distinction and to be guided thereby.

H. G. Rickover
Captain, USN

June 5, 1953

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Practical Suggestions

Suggestion #1

Leadership should set high, rising standards far above minimum requirements. Senior leadership should stay informed about current compliance with standards through frequent visits by their staff and themselves to the field. As Rickover said:

“You get what you inspect, not what you expect.”

Suggestion #2

Leaders in organisations that use complex, unforgiving technologies (for example, nuclear energy, oil and gas, refining, healthcare, chemicals, nuclear weapons, and artificial intelligence) should have substantial technical training to make risk-informed decisions. Training for all levels of the organization (executive leadership to the shop floor) should be rigorous and constant.

Suggestion #3

Processes should be designed to be as simple and error-tolerant as possible. The initial error-tolerant design (the prototype) should undergo robust testing and evaluation before full-scale production begins. Problems should be expected. Reporting of problems should be encouraged and expected. People must learn from experience. Advanced root cause analysis should be applied to develop improvement ideas to eliminate problems.

Suggestion #4

Executives, managers, supervisors, operators, and mechanics must face the facts and resist the human inclination to hope that things will work out despite evidence to the contrary. These conservative decisions must be encouraged despite schedule delays and significant costs. Senior executives should set the example for the entire organization.

Final Comment

Rickover didn’t just preach about making practical, conservative decisions; he lived it and set it as the standard in the Nuclear Navy. If you would like to learn more, read the set of articles about the normalization of excellence at THIS LINK.